资源与产业 ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 114-125.DOI: 10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20220527.006

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补赔奖融合机制下流域干支流治污减排策略演化博弈分析

杨耀红 1,2,刘 盈 1,代 静 1,曾 怡 1   

  1. (1. 华北水利水电大学 水利学院,河南 郑州 450046
    2. 河南省黄河流域水资源节约集约利用重点实验室,河南 郑州 450046)
  • 收稿日期:2021-08-20 修回日期:2021-12-01 出版日期:2021-06-20 发布日期:2022-07-20
  • 通讯作者: 刘盈,硕士生,主要从事资源环境管理研究。E-mail:x201910103118@stu.ncwu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:杨耀红,博士、教授,主要从事工程管理,资源环境管理研究 Email:yangyaohong@ncwu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(42007158);河南省学科创新引智基地项目“智慧水利”(GXJD004)

GAMBLING ANALYSIS ON POLLUTION CONTROL AND EMISSION REDUCTION STRATEGY OF MAIN & TRIBUTARY STREAMS UNDER COMPENSATION-REWARD MECHANISM

YANG Yaohong 1, 2, LIU Ying 1, DAI Jing 1, ZENG Yi 1   

  1. (1. School of Water Conservancy, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China; 
    2. Key Laboratory of Water Resources Conservation and Intensive Utilization in the Yellow River Basin, Zhengzhou 450046, China)
  • Received:2021-08-20 Revised:2021-12-01 Online:2021-06-20 Published:2022-07-20
  • Contact: LIU Ying

摘要: 流域是由干流和多个、多级支流组成的相互影响的复杂系统,为了解决流域水污染和水生态环境问题,需要干流和支流各地区的共同治理。然而,现有的研究大多关注上下游水污染治理机制的研究,对于干流与多个支流间治污协作机制的研究较少,因此水污染协同治理机制很难在全流域实施。论文为系统性解决流域跨界水污染问题,形成覆盖整个流域的水污染治理机制,将上下游跨界水污染治理研究拓展到干流和两个支流,研究干流政府和两支流政府决策行为的变化规律和影响因素。基于演化博弈模型,通过构建三方政府博弈收益矩阵并求解复制动态方程,探讨补偿赔偿奖励融合机制下三方政府策略选择的演化稳定路径,并讨论了博弈均衡点策略演化的稳定条件。基于数值仿真分析了污染转移系数、干流政府对支流政府的奖励以及初始治污意愿等参数对三方策略选择的影响规律。研究结果表明:1)支流政府之间的主要影响因素是污染转移系数和初始治污意愿,某一支流污染转移系数越大,其他支流治理意愿越低,当污染转移系数超过某一临界值时,其他支流会选择不治理的策略,同时支流政府的初始治污意愿越高,其稳定于治理策略的速度越快,污染转移系数的临界值越大;2)干支流政府之间的主要影响因素是干流政府对支流政府的补偿和奖励以及支流政府对干流政府的生态赔偿,干流政府对支流政府额外治污减排的奖励越多,越能激励支流政府治污减排。研究结论可为干流和多个支流间形成生态补偿、赔偿和奖励机制以达到治污减排目标提供参考。

关键词: 跨界水污染, 补赔奖融合机制, 干支流治污减排, 演化博弈

Abstract: Stream is composed of several main and tributary streams, an interactive and complicated system. Stream water pollution and eco-environmental issues need a cooperation of main streams and tributary streams. Most studies are focused on water pollution prevention and controls of upper-to down-stream, less on the cooperation of main and tributary streams, which is hard to conduct a whole-stream cooperative water pollution control. This paper, aiming at a systematic solution to trans-boundary stream water pollution, presents a whole-stream water pollution control which extends upper-to down-stream water pollution control to main and tributary streams, on which evolution and factors of governmental decision are analyzed. Based on a gambling evolution model, this paper establishes a triple governmental gambling return matrix and a dynamic equation, discusses a stable evolution path under compensation-reward mechanism, and analyzes the stability conditions of gambling balancing strategy. Numeric simulation is used to study the pollution migration coefficient, rewards of main stream government to tributary stream government and initial pollution control will. Results show that the major factor among tributary governments, the bigger pollution migration coefficient in one tributary stream, the lower will of the other tributary streams to control pollution. If the coefficient is larger than the critical value, the other tributary governments prefer to do nothing. The higher initial will to control pollution of the tributary government, the larger the coefficient. Factors between main stream and tributary stream governments are compensation and rewards of main stream government to tributary steam government, and ecological compensation of tributary stream government to main stream government, the more rewards, the higher will to control pollution. This paper provides references for main and tributary stream governments to make ecological compensation and rewarding mechanism to reach pollution control and emission reduction. 

Key words: trans-boundary water pollution, compensation-rewarding mechanism, main and tributary stream pollution control and emission reduction, gambling evolution

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