政府制定生态修复目标与生态修复产业的市场化发展关系研究——基于演化博弈的方法

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20221024.002

资源与产业 ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (6): 127-136.DOI: 10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20221024.002

政府制定生态修复目标与生态修复产业的市场化发展关系研究——基于演化博弈的方法

戴诗茂，马雪飞，孙浩

(上海理工大学管理学院，上海 200093）

收稿日期:2021-09-14 修回日期:2022-05-09 出版日期:2022-12-20 发布日期:2023-02-21
作者简介:戴诗茂，硕士研究生，主要从事产业经济学、产业发展与规划研究。E-mail：1978425650@qq.com

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S SETTING OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION OBJECTIVES AND THE MARKETIZED DEVELOPMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INDUSTRY: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME BASED APPROACH

DAI Shimao, MA Xuefei, SUN Hao

(Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China)

Received:2021-09-14 Revised:2022-05-09 Online:2022-12-20 Published:2023-02-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

生态修复是一种追求达到最佳效果和最低耗费的综合性恢复重建被破坏生态环境的方法。随着我国社会与经济的快速发展，过去“谁污染，谁治理”的传统生态修复模式不但效率低下，而且经常达不到环境修复标准。为了推动生态修复的高质量发展就必须在坚持政府主导的前提条件下，积极探索利用市场化方式推进各项生态修复实践，充分发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用，聚焦生态保护重点领域，激发市场活力，维护国家生态安全，推动美丽中国建设。本文在兼顾生态效益和经济效益的基础之上，通过构建政府与生态破坏企业之间的演化博弈模型，深入研究政府制定的不同生态修复目标与生态修复产业市场化发展之间的必然联系和演变规律，探究影响生态修复产业发展的各种因素，并运用数据演化仿真分析验证该演化博弈模型的有效性。研究结果表明：不同生态修复目标的监管成本、专业生态修复企业实现规模经济的程度，以及生态修复目标所产生的经济效益是政府与生态破坏企业之间演化博弈模型中的关键性影响因素。研究结论：1）在经济发达地区，政府可以通过制定高标准的生态修复目标有效推动生态修复产业的市场化发展。2）政府选择简洁、明了的生态监管方式，聘请专业生态评估机构进行生态修复评估，能够有效降低生态监管成本、提高生态监管效率，有益于生态修复产业市场化的发展。3）专业生态修复企业应不断增强绿色创新能力，尽可能降低生态修复成本实现规模经济效益，以获得修复成果和期望收益的双赢，进而推动经济社会与生态的高质量协调发展。

关键词: 生态修复产业；演化博弈；市场化发展, 演化博弈模型

Abstract: Ecological restoration is a way to comprehensively restore damaged environment with premium results at minimum costs. As China’s society and economy develop rapidly, the conventional restoration of “who made who restore”is low in efficiency, and below the objectives. To reach a quality ecological restoration, it is a good practice to approach in marketized way under guidelines of governments, which can fully fulfill the determination of markets in resource allocation, focus on key ecological domains, power the markets, maintain nation’s ecological security and push construction of “Beautiful China”. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model between government and ecological destruction enterprise with attention on both ecological and economic benefits, which is used to deeply explore the inevitable relation and evolutionary rules between government made ecological restoration objectives and marketized ecological restoration development, and discuss the factors, and uses data evolutionary simulation to validate the model. Key factors in the evolutionary game model include supervision costs in ecological restoration objectives, scale economic extent to be reached in professional restoration, and economic benefits. It concludes that governments can effectively boost the marketized development of ecological restoration by making high standards of ecological restoration objectives in developed areas. The government chooses a concise and clear way of ecological supervision and employs professional ecological assessment agencies to conduct ecological restoration assessment, which can decrease the supervision costs and increase the supervision efficiency, all favorable for a marketized ecological restoration development. Professionally ecological restoration enterprises shall intensify their green innovative abilities to minimize the restoration costs to realize scale economic benefits with gaining both restoration achievement and expected economic returns, further to reach a quality coordinated development of economic society and ecology.

Key words: ecological restoration industry, evolutionary game; marketized development, evolutionary game model

中图分类号:

戴诗茂, 马雪飞, 孙浩.

政府制定生态修复目标与生态修复产业的市场化发展关系研究——基于演化博弈的方法 [J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(6): 127-136.

DAI Shimao, MA Xuefei, SUN Hao.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S SETTING OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION OBJECTIVES AND THE MARKETIZED DEVELOPMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INDUSTRY: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME BASED APPROACH [J]. Resources & Industries, 2022, 24(6): 127-136.

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政府制定生态修复目标与生态修复产业的市场化发展关系研究——基于演化博弈的方法

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S SETTING OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION OBJECTIVES AND THE MARKETIZED DEVELOPMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INDUSTRY: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME BASED APPROACH

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