This paper, based on provincial panel data from 2007 to 2016, uses TOPSIS to study the dynamic changes and regional variance of water resource carrying capacity of provinces along Yangtze River economic zone with results showing a slowly declining trend, mostly contributed by water resource sub-system and social sub-system. Water resource carrying capacity decreases toward the down-stream with Chengyu economic zone seating on the top from regional difference. Viewing from provinces, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Shanghai, Hu'nan, Yunnan, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Hubei and Anhui are in a decreasing order. From spatial distribution, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Hu'nan and Shanghai bear the higher capacity. It is also of a falling coupling coordination. It is found that water production, urban daily water use, GDP growth rate and waste water handling investment proportion cast a large influence on water resource carrying capacity. Generally, water carrying capacity of Yangtze River economic zone is at a medium level probably due to large population, inappropriate industrial structure and low water recycling rate. Suggestions are presented accordingly.
To protect the fairness of trade pricing of water discharging rights and to promote effective execution of water discharging right trade, this paper establishes an asymmetric information barging model based on fairness-preferred trade pricing of water discharging rights, which adopts reverse induction to solve three-staged barging gambling balance. Matlab R2014a is used to analyze the impacts of parameters on premier pricing and gambling effect. The higher acceptable lowest compensation price by seller is or highest compensation price by buyer is, the higher premier price is. If the highest compensation price by seller equals to the lowest acceptable compensation price by buyer in increment, the increased asking premier price by the former is larger than the latter. Fairness preference and discounting factor have little direction impacts on premier pricing at different gambling stages. The lower the lowest compensation price accepted by seller is or the higher the highest compensation price paid by buyer is, meaning a larger barging range, the higher the gambling effect will be made by both sides. The larger the barging discounting factor by both is, the larger gambling effect will be acquired by both. As discounting factor rises, if fairness preference maintained at a certain level, the buyer's whole gambling effect level is lower that the seller even if buyer asks price first and both maintain an equal earning increment.
To explore the impact mechanism of heterogeneously environmental regulations on green total factor productivity, this paper uses SBM to estimate the green total factor productivities (GTFP) of “economy-resource-environment-society” in each province, and divides environmental regulation tools into four categories, command-controlling, economy-stimulating, harness-inputting and public-participating, and establishes a spatial Durbin model and threshold effect model to include that heterogeneously environmental regulations impose direct, indirect and spatial overflow effects on green total factor productivity if adjusted by energy consumption structure. Economy-stimulating and public-participating environmental regulations impact GTFP locally and neighboring areas through adjusting energy consumption structure. Command-controlling, economy-stimulating and public-participating environmental regulations impact GFTP through a threshold effect. Under adjustment of energy consumption structure, indirect effect of command-controlling and economy-stimulating environmental regulations on GTFP also through a threshold effect. This paper suggests that governments shall consider the interaction of other energy consumption structures in making environmental regulations, and adopt appropriate regulations and intensity to apply in areas with different energy consumption levels.
As internet grows fast, network is becoming a vent of environmental interests conflict of major water projects, the public irrational awareness of their environmental impacts is readily to form network rumor so as to enlarge its social risk. This paper uses environmental damage rumor to explore its transmitting mechanism of major water projects in interaction of government-media-public, and quantitatively studies the impacts of rumor during network transmission on risk management via its hyperspatiotemporal, multiple subjectivity and universality, and discusses paths to governmental governance and prevention of social risks. Matlab simulation suggests that measures such as refuting rumor speed, intensity and information openness vary with rumor transmitting group, stages, information causes and importance. This paper presents suggestions accordingly.
