污染产业转移背景下的生态补偿与政府监督问题——基于补偿申请的信号博弈

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20230710.001

资源与产业 ›› 2023, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 105-114.DOI: 10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20230710.001

污染产业转移背景下的生态补偿与政府监督问题——基于补偿申请的信号博弈

王玉芳，马晓敏

（天津财经大学统计学院，天津 300204）

收稿日期:2023-01-19 修回日期:2023-03-23 出版日期:2023-12-20 发布日期:2023-12-20
通讯作者: 马晓敏，硕士生，主要从事管理经济与应用统计研究。E-mail：18435223640@163.com
作者简介:王玉芳，博士、副教授，主要从事管理经济与应用统计研究。E-mail：yufangwang@tjufe.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目（19CGL002）。

ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION AND GOVERNMENTAL SUPERVISION UNDER POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL MIGRATION BASED ON SIGNAL GAMING OF COMPENSATION APPLICATION

WANG Yufang, MA Xiaomin

(School of Statistics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300204, China)

Received:2023-01-19 Revised:2023-03-23 Online:2023-12-20 Published:2023-12-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为缓解信息不对称，摆脱政策漏洞，本文将补偿申请作为信号，构建污染产业转移背景下地方政府间基于生态补偿的信号博弈模型，探讨不同条件下的博弈均衡解，分析产业转移方对承接方的有效补偿机制，为政府间生态补偿和中央政府监督提供决策支持。研究结果表明：1）完全成功的分离均衡作为社会最优解是存在的，纳入补偿主动申请机制能够有效缓解信息不对称，促进承接方根据自身减排情况申请匹配的生态补偿，同时转移方给予相应补偿；2）适量的惩罚是促进均衡实现的关键，其中，当转移方的惩罚满足Ft>H－L，承接方的惩罚满足Fr+C>H－L时，即可实现社会最优均衡，惩罚过度会造成社会资源的浪费，而惩罚过低则会挫伤承接方高减排的积极性；3）沉没成本（C）和承接方被惩罚的风险成本（Fr）在防止低减排类型的承接方申请高补偿方面具有可替代性，若沉没成本和风险成本之和高于高低补偿之间的差额，能够减少低类型承接方的欺骗行为。

关键词: 生态补偿, 产业转移, 信号博弈, 惩罚机制, 均衡分析

Abstract:

This paper, aiming at mitigating opaque information and policy loophole, uses compensation application as signal to establish a signal gaming model based on ecological compensation of local government under pollution industrial migration, which is applied to discuss its gaming balance under different conditions, and to analyze effective compensation mechanism of industrial migration sender to receiver, providing references for governmental ecological compensation and central governmental supervision. Complete success of separated balance as the premium solution exists, initiative compensation application is working in mitigating opaque information. Receiver shall consider to match ecological compensation in terms of its emission reduction, and sender shall accordingly give the compensation. Appropriate punishment is key to the balance in reaching a social premium balance when sender ‘s punishment meetsFt

Key words: ecological compensation, industrial migration, signal gaming, punishment mechanisms, balance analysis

中图分类号:

F205

王玉芳, 马晓敏.

污染产业转移背景下的生态补偿与政府监督问题——基于补偿申请的信号博弈 [J]. 资源与产业, 2023, 25(6): 105-114.

WANG Yufang, MA Xiaomin.

ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION AND GOVERNMENTAL SUPERVISION UNDER POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL MIGRATION BASED ON SIGNAL GAMING OF COMPENSATION APPLICATION [J]. Resources & Industries, 2023, 25(6): 105-114.

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污染产业转移背景下的生态补偿与政府监督问题——基于补偿申请的信号博弈

ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION AND GOVERNMENTAL SUPERVISION UNDER POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL MIGRATION BASED ON SIGNAL GAMING OF COMPENSATION APPLICATION

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