基于多利益主体的调水工程生态补偿演化博弈分析

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20240026.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

极端气候的频发使得生态环境问题日益得到社会各界的重视，人与自然的和谐可持续发展是中国追求高质量发展的必由之路。调水工程是一项缓解区域之间水资源不平衡的重要民生工程，跨流域调水工程的实施涉及多方利益主体，生态补偿是跨流域调水工程可持续开展的必要保障。论文以牛栏江—滇池补水工程为例，就其生态补偿现状和问题涉及的各利益主体，结合演化博弈理论，从宏观和微观层面构建博弈模型，进行流域多利益主体博弈分析。研究发现：1）宏观层面上，调水区与受水区的自发博弈无法到达生态的均衡演化，需要引入上级反馈机制加以干预，反馈投诉成本、投诉补贴金额以及调水区的预期估值与实现生态补偿均衡有直接的关系；2）微观层面上，政府、企业和公众的演化博弈受到治理费用、政府补贴与惩罚力度等诸多因素的影响；3）从牛栏江—滇池补水工程的仿真分析中得出该项补偿工程呈现出牛栏江保护、滇池不补偿、上级部门不监管的演化趋势，其中滇池的策略选择受到滇池补偿费用和投诉补偿的影响，上级部门的策略选择受到对滇池的惩罚金额和上级部门付出成本的影响。因此提出，在调水工程的生态补偿中，应当拓宽筹资渠道、完善反馈投诉体系、引入政府监督和管控，促进调水工程的可持续开展。

关键词: 调水工程, 生态补偿, 演化博弈, 多利益主体

Abstract: Highly-frequent extreme weather catches all eyes on eco-environment. A coordinated and sustainable development between human and nature is an unavoidable way to China’s high-quality development. Water transferring projects are designed to mitigate water resource imbalance among areas, and water transferring projects trans-streams may involve multiple stakeholders, that makes ecological compensation a necessary guarantee for their sustainable development. This paper, based on a case study on Niulan River-Dianchi Water Replenishing Project, establishes a gaming model, macroscopically and microscopically, to study multiple stakeholders’ gaming mechanism regarding ecological compensation situation and issues. Macroscopically, spontaneous gaming between water-supplying areas and water-receiving areas can not reach a ecologically evolutionary balance, which needs to be intervened by upper administration on complaining cost, allowance and anticipated valuation of water-supplying areas. Microscopically, evolutionary gaming among governments, firms and the public is influenced by harness fee, governmental compensation and punishment strength. Simulation of Niulan River-Dianchi Water Replenishing Project indicates an evolutionary trend of protection of Niulan River, uncompensated Dianchi, and no supervision from upper administration. Dianchi is impacted by its compensation and complaining, and upper administration is impacted by punishment fines for Dianchi and higher administration’s and costs. This paper presents suggestions on widening financing ways, improving complaining-responding system, adopting governmental supervision and control amid water-transferring projects’ ecological compensation for their sustainable development.

Key words: water transferring projects, ecological compensation, evolutionary gaming, multiple stakeholders

中图分类号:

F205
F224.32

刘林玲, 刘红琴, 谭丽峰. 基于多利益主体的调水工程生态补偿演化博弈分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(1): 154-161.

LIU Linling, LIU Hongqin, TAN Lifeng. EVOLUTIONARY GAMING ANALYSIS ON ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION OF WATER TRANSFERRING PROJECTS BASED ON MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS[J]. Resources & Industries, 2024, 26(1): 154-161.

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