全球碳中和愿景下绿色能源国际合作的演化博弈分析

doi:10.13776j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20230426.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

如何摆脱工业文明发展范式中零和博弈的掣肘，以务实高效的绿色能源国际合作促进构建公平合理、合作共赢的全球气候治理体系，已成为实现全球碳中和愿景、筑牢人类命运共同体面临的重要问题。基于发达国家与发展中国家所处的发展阶段以及在应对全球气候变化问题上的能力和责任，分析绿色能源国际合作的实现机理；通过动态演化博弈模型探讨不同情形下发达国家与发展中国家绿色能源竞合互动关系,运用仿真分析模拟多种情形下主要参数初始值变化对双方博弈策略演化趋势的影响，以探寻博弈双方行为的动态演化路径和稳定策略。研究表明：发达国家与发展中国家在要素禀赋、市场结构和发展诉求上兼具互补性，绿色能源国际合作符合双方共同利益，有助于实现全球碳中和目标；绿色能源国际合作博弈双方的策略选择具有一致性，合作是博弈双方的最优均衡策略选择；政府政策激励是影响发达国家与发展中国家策略选择的关键因素，绿色能源国际合作的预期收益提高，政府对绿色能源的政策激励增加，绿色能源国际合作的投入成本减少与风险损失降低，有利于博弈双方行为演化趋向共赢的局面。立足共同应对全球气候变化、构建人类命运共同体的价值共识，深入推进绿色能源国际合作，加速全球碳中和目标实现，需要重点推进以下几个方面的政策设计：各国政府应大力发展绿色能源产业，加强相关政策支持，提升企业参与绿色能源国际合作的积极性，增加绿色能源国际合作的潜在收益；企业应加强绿色低碳技术创新，促进绿色能源开发和利用技术和标准向全球推广，进而降低绿色能源国际合作成本；世界各国应摒弃冷战思维与零和博弈观念，巩固深化政治互信，共同防范和应对绿色能源国际合作风险，携手推进全球发展方式绿色低碳转型。

关键词: 碳中和, 绿色能源, 国际合作, 演化博弈, 全球气候变化

Abstract: To get rid of zero-sum game in industrialized culture and to promote an equal global green energy cooperation in harnessing the global climate has become a vital global topic in carbon neutralization and human ‘s mutual community. This paper, based on developing stages, capabilities and responsibilities on global climate changes in developing and developed countries,analyzes the implementation mechanism of global green energy cooperation. A dynamic evolutionary gaming model is used to discuss an interaction between developed and developing countries on green energy competition and cooperation. Simulation is applied to study the impacts of initial major parameters ‘ changes on both gaming strategies under multiple scenarios, aiming at obtaining a dynamic evolutionary path and a stable strategy. Developed countries are complementary with developing ones in resources, market structures and developing desires.Green energy cooperation involving their mutual benefits, helpful in reaching the global carbon neutralization, is the optimal strategy. Governmental incentive policies playing a key role in their strategic choices may be increased as the expected benefits on global green energy coalition rises. A decreasing cost and risk in global green energy cooperation is favorable to reaching a win-win status between the gaming parties.Enhancing global green energy cooperation, mutually dealing with global climate changes and accelerating global carbon neutralization need to focus on governmental support, which can improve participants ‘ enthusiasm in global green energy coalition and increase the potential gains.Companies shall boost green low-carbon technical innovation to better develop and use green energy globally at a lower cost.All countries shall be cooperative in global green energy with removal of cold war views and zero-sum idea for a global transformation to green low-carbon development.

Key words: carbon neutralization, green energy, global cooperation, evolutionary gaming, global climate change

中图分类号:

F206

肖雨彤, 陈军. 全球碳中和愿景下绿色能源国际合作的演化博弈分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2023, 25(3): 19-30.

XIAO Yutong, CHEN Jun. EVOLUTIONARY GAMING ANALYSIS ON GREEN ENERGY INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION UNDER GLOBAL CARBON NEUTRALIZATION[J]. Resources & Industries, 2023, 25(3): 19-30.

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