资源与产业 ›› 2013, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (4): 130-136.

• 资源经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于不完全信息的矿业股权转让动态博弈模型与应用

郑明贵,张颖,木日根   

  1. 1.江西理工大学矿业贸易与投资研究中心,江西赣州341000;2.内蒙古自治区第一水文地质工程地质勘查院,内蒙古呼和浩特010020
  • 收稿日期:2012-12-05 修回日期:2013-05-01 出版日期:2013-07-10 发布日期:2013-07-10
  • 通讯作者: 郑明贵(E-mail:mingguiz@163.com)
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金项目(12CGL008);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA790208);江西理工大学校级研究生创新专项资金项目(YC11-02)

A DYNAMIC GAMING MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION OF MINING EQUITY TRANSFER BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

Zheng Minggui, Zhang Ying, Murigen,et al   

  1. 1.Research Center of Mining Trade and Investment, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000, China; 2. Inner Mongolia First Hydrogeology Engineering Geological Prospecting Institute, Huhhot 010020, China
  • Received:2012-12-05 Revised:2013-05-01 Online:2013-07-10 Published:2013-07-10

摘要:

矿业投资过程中矿山企业股权转让存在竞争,如何使投资者在股权转让中获得较高的收益是一个值得研究的问题。以矿业公司在转让股权时实现利益最大化为研究目标,分析矿业股权转让相关利益方的博弈,建立基于不完全信息的矿业股权转让动态博弈模型,分析模型均衡状态下博弈双方的策略组合,并给出各策略组合下博弈双方期望收益的计算公式。最后,以江西省某矿业开发有限公司(合资公司)投资钼矿项目为例进行应用,对该项目中利益相关方之间的博弈进行分析,并结合具体数据,得到了各利益相关方之间的博弈均衡解。为投资公司提供的决策结论为:应以不高于3 000万元的转让价款收购某地调队持有的45%的股份,期望收益较高。

关键词: 矿业股权转让, 投资决策, 博弈模型, 收益

Abstract:

Mining equity transfer during mining investment is always with competition. How to maximize the investors benefits is a good study topic. This paper analyzes the gaming of beneficiaries of mining equity transfer, establishes a dynamic gaming model of mining equity transfer based on incomplete information, discusses the strategic combinations under a balanced model and gives formulas for their expected benefits. Based on a case study of molybdenum project invested by a mining development company (joint venture) in Jiangxi Province, this paper draws a conclusion for investors reference that it should pay 30 million Yuan at most to acquire 45% equity from the geological survey. 

Key words: mining equity transfer, investment decision, gaming model, benefits

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