RELATION AMONG STATEOWNED EQUITY, BOARD CHAIN AND ENTERPRISE R&D INVESTMENT BASED ON DUAL PERSPECTIVES OF RESOURCE RELIANCE AND DEPUTY

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20230717.005

Abstract

Abstract: Under China's mixed ownership reform, this paper, aiming at exploring the relation among strate-owned equity, board chain and enterprise R&D investment, from a dual perspective of resource reliance and deputy theories, selects China's A-share high-tech companies' 2010 to 2019 panel data, uses fixed effect regression model to deeply study the multiple mechanism of action among state-owned equity, board chain and enterprise R&D investment，and the robustness test and heterogeneity analysis were carried out. Board chain has an influence factor at 0.226 on R&D investment, outstandingly above 10%, indicating its positive influence, helpful for enterprises to gaining innovative resources from external environment and organizations. Regression coefficients of state-owned equity to board chain and to enterprise R&D investment reach to 0.907 and 1.191, both outstandingly above 5%, suggesting their positive correlation. The influence of state-owned equity on R&D investment still remains obvious after board chain as a mediating variable added, regression coefficient down to 0.180 from 0.191, and outstanding above 5%, indicating that the board chain plays a mediating role between state-owned equity and enterprise R&D investment. The influence coefficient of the interaction term between state-owned equity and board chain is -3.299, outstandingly above 5%, indicating that stateowned equity plays a moderating role between board chain and enterprise R&D investment, when the proportion of stateowned equity to total equity is low, board chain has a positive effect on enterprise R&D investment，when the proportion of stateowned equity is high, the board chain has a negative effect on enterprise R&D investment.

Key words: board chain, stateowned equity, enterprise R&D investment；mixed ownership reform

摘要： 在我国大力推动混合所有制改革的时代背景之下,为了探究国有股权、董事会连锁与企业研发投入之间的关系,本文从资源依赖理论和代理理论的双重视角出发,将我国沪深股市A股上市的高科技企业作为研究样本,选取2010—2019年我国高科技企业的相关面板数据,运用固定效应回归模型,对国有股权、董事会连锁与企业研发投入之间的多重作用机制进行深入研究,并进行稳健性检验与异质性分析。研究结果表明:1)董事会连锁对研发投入的影响系数为0.226,且在10%的水平上显著,表明董事会连锁对企业研发投入起着正向影响作用,通过董事会连锁有助于企业从外部环境、外部组织等获取创新资源。2)国有股权与董事会连锁及其研发投入的回归系数分别为0907和0191,且均在5%水平上显著,表明国有股权与董事会连锁及企业研发投入均存在正相关关系。此外,国有股权对研发投入的影响作用在加入中介变量董事会连锁之后依旧显著,回归系数从0.191下降到0.180,且在5%的水平上显著,表明董事会连锁在国有股权与企业研发投入之间发挥着中介作用。3)国有股权与董事会连锁交互项的影响系数为-3.299,且在5%的水平上显著,表明国有股权在董事会连锁与企业研发投入之间发挥着调节作用,即当国有股权占企业全部股权的比例较低时,董事会连锁对企业研发投入发挥着正向影响作用；而当国有股权占企业全部股权的比例较高时,董事会连锁则对企业研发投入发挥着负向影响作用。

关键词: 董事会连锁, 国有股权, 企业研发投入, 混合所有制改革

CLC Number:

F271

YU Sichen, TIAN Ming, ZHANG Yang, . RELATION AMONG STATEOWNED EQUITY, BOARD CHAIN AND ENTERPRISE R&D INVESTMENT BASED ON DUAL PERSPECTIVES OF RESOURCE RELIANCE AND DEPUTY[J]. Resources & Industries, 2023, 25(4): 139-149.

余思晨, 田鸣, 张阳, . 国有股权、董事会连锁与企业研发投入——基于资源依赖与代理的双重视角[J]. 资源与产业, 2023, 25(4): 139-149.

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