Abstract:

This paper, based on Cartel and competition models, discusses OPEC’s oil production behavior during 1971 to 2008, combines with OPEC’s reserve/production ratio and idle capacity, and the production changes during descending 1980 to 1985 and ascending 1999 to 2008, concludes that OPEC’s has no competition, in general its production behavior trends to occupy markets. OPEC’s core members include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Qatar, interim members Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria, and marginal members Angola, Algeria, Ecuador. It’s production size is controlled in the core members and partial interim members. Through setting quota, OPEC can control the gross 〖JP3〗production, which can basically increase the oil price. Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE as three major oil exporters are relatively low in their production accretion, which played a key role in oil rise during 1999 to 2008.

Key words: OPEC’s oil production, Cartel, oic price

摘要：

本文针对卡特尔和竞争两种模型分析讨论了1971—2008年欧佩克的石油生产行为，结合欧佩克的储采比和剩余产能状况、1980—1985年油价下跌期和1999—2008年油价上升期欧佩克成员国的产量变化状况，得出如下认识：欧佩克不具备竞争特征；整体上欧佩克的产量行为倾向于分占市场模型；欧佩克分为核心成员国（沙特阿拉伯、科威特、阿联酋、利比亚和卡塔尔）、中间成员国（伊朗、伊拉克、委内瑞拉和尼日利亚）和边缘成员国（安哥拉、阿尔及利亚和厄瓜多尔）；控制产量规模主要在欧佩克的核心和部分中间成员国中实现，欧佩克通过设置配额控制了总产量，基本起到了提高油价的目的；沙特阿拉伯、伊朗和阿联酋3个欧佩克主要出口国的增产力度偏低，在1999—2008年的油价上涨过程中起到重要的作用。

关键词: 欧佩克石油产量, 卡特尔, 油价