Abstract: A quality integrated development of Yangtze River Delta needs attention on its ecological cultural construction, but it faces water shortage and worsening water ecological environmental issues. Trans-regional water resource protection can not be effectively performed due to its externality of water resource as a public affair, which makes ecological compensation of water resource a key point in reaching a co-integrated development in Yangtze River Delta. This paper uses water footprint theory to establish a standard measuring model of 2008 to 2017 bidirectional water footprint ecological compensation of Yangtze River Delta, and constructs an evolutionary gaming model based on central-governmental constraining-stimulating mechanism to reach an optimal stable balanced strategy. Yangtze River Delta is simulated as a water importing area with rising imports and consumption during the decade at yearly average consumption up to 158.62 billion cubic meters, in actual water use most by agricultural water footprint, while trading water footprint is rising at an uneven rate. Jiangsu contributes the most in simulated water use, followed by Anhui, Zhejiang and Shanghai. Its ecological compensation amounts shows a climbing tendency. Jiangsu gets the most at a yearly RMB9.222 billion, followed by Zhejiang, Anhui and Shanghai, but Jiangsu has a lowest compensation to input ratio at 63%, and Shanghai is the highest at 78%. After constraining-stimulating mechanism is in place, Yangtze River Delta can reach an optimal balanced protection and compensation strategy if central governmental sum of fines and stimulus is higher than its ecological compensation amounts on either defaults, and if the sum is higher than two times of opportunity cost, and less than its compensation amounts on both defaults, Zhejiang seats on top in stimulating and punishing range changes in the decade. 

Key words: Yangtze River Delta integration, simulated water footprint, ecological compensation, evolution gaming, constraining-stimulation mechanism

摘要： 推动长三角地区高质量一体化发展，需要高度重视长三角生态文明建设。现今长三角地区水资源短缺和水生态环境恶化问题依然严重，且水资源作为一种公共物品，其本身存在的外部性导致跨区域水资源保护机制无法顺利实施，如何解决水资源生态补偿问题成为长三角地区协同发展的关键。本文基于水足迹理论构建2008—2017年长三角双向水足迹生态补偿标准计量模型，并在引入中央政府“约束-激励”机制下构建演化博弈模型，分析各相关主体的博弈决策，从而实现最优的稳定均衡策略，最后从不同主体角度提出相应的对策。研究发现：1）长三角地区为虚拟水进口地区， 其虚拟水净进口量及消费量在10年间呈上升趋势，年平均消费量达到1 586.2亿m³。从类别结构看，农业水足迹实际用水量最大，而贸易水足迹一直处于上升趋势且变化较大；从地区看，虚拟水消费量贡献最大的为江苏省，其次为安徽、浙江、上海。2）长三角三省一市生态补偿额度10年间均呈上升趋势，其中江苏省获得的生态补偿金额最多，年平均达到92.22亿元，其次为浙江、安徽、上海；但江苏省的年平均生态补偿额对于生态投入成本的占比最低，仅为63%，上海最高，达到78%。3）引入“约束-激励”机制后，当中央政府对单方面不履行义务时的处罚F与激励金额 B之和大于当地所获得的生态补偿P，且中央政府对双方同时不履行义务时的处罚Q与激励金额B之和大于机会成本C的2倍，小于所获得的补偿金额P时，长三角地区可以实现最优的稳定均衡策略（保护， 补偿），其中浙江省的激励惩罚范围在10年间变化幅度最大。

关键词: 长三角一体化, 虚拟水足迹, 生态补偿, 演化博弈, “约束-激励”机制