基于前景理论的黄河流域水环境治理三方演化博弈研究

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20240529.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为推动黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展，需要对水环境治理的关键举措进行探讨。考虑决策主体的不完全理性，引入前景理论，建立政府-企业-民众三方演化博弈模型，并通过数值仿真分析演化过程。结果表明：排污企业最终趋向于严格排污，民众则趋向于不参与监督，在政府策略倾向于加强治理的情况下仿真结果与黄河流域的实际情况是一致的。民众的策略选择仍略微滞后于政府，表明政府在水环境治理中对民众的引导作用。在考察罚款、企业绿色补贴和民众监督补贴对演化结果的影响时，发现并未明显影响主体最终达到稳定策略的时间，表明初始策略的选择更为关键。根据演化结果，提出对策建议，为推进黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展提供理论支持和决策依据。对地方政府而言，应严格依照相关条例，规范各部门职权，加大对污水处理厂的投入建设，完善相关法律法规。同时可借助大数据信息平台，加强流域间合作水平。对排污企业而言，应明确自身社会责任，应慎重考虑开展强污染项目，继续严格按照指标控污。政府可适当增加对流域内企业排污的绿色补贴，推动其进行绿色创新以及使用清洁能源。对民众而言，不仅需要自觉履行保护黄河流域水环境的义务，树立流域绿色发展新理念，积极响应流域内政府部门的倡议，主动监督排污企业，并在必要时举报不法行为。同时相关部门也应建立明确的黄河流域水质水环境保护的效应激励机制，明确奖励标准，采取多元化的激励措施，充分激发社会各界参与保护黄河流域水环境的积极性。

关键词: 前景理论, 水环境治理；演化博弈；仿真分析；黄河流域

Abstract: Key approaches to water environment need to be discussed for ecological protection and quality development of Yellow River stream. Prospect theory is used to establish a triple government-enterprise-private evolutionary gaming model on the consideration of irrational decision maker; numerical simulation is applied to analyze its evolution process. Enterprises eventually trend to strictly discharge pollution and the public trend to not participate in the supervision; the simulated results are consistent with the actual in Yellow River stream under intensifying governmental harness. The public's selection is a little lagging to governments, suggesting a leading role of governments on the public in water environmental harness. While evaluating the impacts of fines, enterprises' green subsidy and public supervision on evolution results, no one is found obviously affecting the finally-reaching stable strategy time, meaning the original selection is a key. Suggestions presented based on the evolution results provide theoretical supports and decision references for ecological protection and quality development in Yellow River stream. Local governments shall enlarge inputs on pollution water facilities construction according to laws and regulations, and boost trans-stream cooperation via data platform. Enterprises shall clarify their social responsibilities and take extra consideration on heavily pollution projects, strictly abiding by the quota in pollution emission. Governments may increase the green subsidy to enterprises for pollution emissions within stream, driving them to green innovation and to use of clean energy. The public needs to take responsibility for protecting water environment in Yellow River stream, supervising pollution discharges and reporting illegal activities when necessary. Governments shall set up stimulating means by clarifying the stimulating standard and applying diversified ways to encourage all involvements in protecting water environment in Yellow River stream.

Key words: prospect theory, water environmental harness, evolutionary gaming, simulation analysis, Yellow River stream

中图分类号:

F205

陈玥, 庞庆华. 基于前景理论的黄河流域水环境治理三方演化博弈研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(4): 170-178.

CHEN Yue, PANG Qinghua. TRIPLE EVOLUTIONARY GAMING OF YELLOW RIVER ENVIRONMENTAL HARNESS BASED ON PROSPECT THEORY[J]. Resources & Industries, 2024, 26(4): 170-178.

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