Abstract:

Conflicts between oilfield and locality in property ownership occur frequently, which harrying oil companies’ production. This paper, based on a competition model, analyzes the cause that is neither the ownerships of oil-gas and lands, nor the negative externality from oilfield’s production, but the collective lands where are fully owned by oilfield companies. The local peasants who adhere to their lands prefer to make conflicts by organization and to ask for compensation. An intermediation between mining rights and land rights will be no use for the conflicts. The key point is to find a social link between oilfield and locality, which can make oilfield-locality relation develop to an self-executing mechanism.

Key words: property ownership, oilfield-locality relation, measurement

摘要：

油田与地方的产权冲突是我国油气田勘探开发中的常态问题，困扰着我国石油企业正常的生产秩序。本文运用博弈论模型，分析指出导致油地关系冲突的根源既不在于油气资源和集体土地之间复杂的产权关系，也不在于油气田生产过程中所带来的负外部性问题，而是在于油气田勘探开发过程中集体土地对于油气资源的勘探开发构成地点专用性资产。在资产高度专用性的条件下，解决利益冲突的交易成本经济学方案是进行纵向“一体化”，在对依附于土地的农民不能够进行完全一体化的情况下，地方农民有组织的制造冲突并要求油田进行补偿，始终是地方组织的最优选择。因此，单纯依靠资源矿权和集体土地产权的产权关系调整将无助于解决油地关系冲突，解决油地关系冲突的关键在于实现油田和地方关系的社会链接，有序的社会链接将使油地关系和谐发展成为一种可自我执行的治理机制。

关键词: 产权, 油地关系, 治理机制