解决“煤电矛盾”问题:煤电企业拆分重组的思辨

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20240131.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 煤电企业拆分重组是解决“煤电矛盾”中结构性问题的重要举措。虽然目前央企拆分重组工作已初见成效,但针对煤电部门仍存在诸多认知不足的问题,制约着政策实施的合理性及有效性。为从制度结构的角度解析煤电企业拆分重组面临的阻碍,基于新制度经济学的一般原理,按照“煤电矛盾”→“煤电交易”→“产权优化”→“调节定价”的传导逻辑,对煤电企业的拆分重组进行分析,并以煤电企业拆分重组为切入点,梳理煤电产权与能源价格的关系,聚焦产权优化配置对煤电交易过程有效性的影响问题。首先,运用组织理论,剖析煤电矛盾与煤电交易在治理结构根源上的逻辑关系,结果显示煤电矛盾来源于煤电交易过程中的交易成本不节约；其次,基于现代产权理论及交易成本理论,解析煤电交易与煤电产权之间的底层逻辑,结果显示产权的优化配置决定了煤电交易的资源配置效率及组织效率；最后,构建煤电双方博弈的数理推导模型,指出无效或模糊产权下的负外部性,并建立不同产权配置下调节定价的方式。研究发现:1）现阶段煤电企业拆分重组过程中忽视了交易成本的核算,交易成本不节约会弱化煤电企业拆分重组的成效,弱化市场调节矛盾的能力,进而引致煤电矛盾；2）由于交易成本界定不清晰,当前煤电企业拆分重组存在产权配置不清晰、不合理的隐患,剩余控制权的分配较为简单粗放,制约着煤电企业的兼并效率及组织效率；3）由于现行煤电产权配置模糊,造成定价机制偏离了有效区间。据此提出缓解“煤电矛盾”的政策建议:加快煤电交易成本核算体系的构建及完善；推动混合制治理方式的应用及完善；建立弹性定价机制。

关键词: 煤电矛盾, 煤电交易, 企业拆分重组, 产权优化配置, 调节定价

Abstract: Reconstruction of coal-electricity entities is a vital approach to the structural issues of “coal-electricity contradiction”. Reconstruction of central enterprises had basically been effective, still with insufficient recognition in coal-electricity sector, which affects execution of policies. This paper studies the reconstruction obstacles of coal-electricity entities from regime, based on general rules of new institutional economics in an order of “coal-electricity contradiction”→“coal-electricity trading”→“property right optimization”→“adjusting prices”, clarifies the relationship between coal-electricity property and energy prices, and focuses on its effectiveness of property right optimized allocation on coal-electricity trading process. Organization theory is employed to analyze the structurally logical relation between coal-electricity contradiction and coal-electricity trading with results showing that source of coal-electricity contradiction comes from unsaved costs amid coal-electricity trading. The root logical relation between coal-electricity trading and coal-electricity property revealed by modern property theory and trading cost theory suggests that optimized allocation of property determine the resources allocating efficiency and organizational efficiency of coal-electricity trading. A gaming model of coal-electricity indicates the negative externality under invalid or fuzzy property, adjustable pricing ways are set under different property allocations. Trading costs have been ignored amid the reconstruction of coal-electricity entities, weakening its effectiveness and the market adjusting capabilities, leading to coal-electricity contradiction. Unclear trading costs result in fuzzy property allocation amid reconstruction of coal-electricity entities, allocation of excessive controlling is simple and straight, which constrains its merging and organizational efficiencies of coal-electricity entities. The fuzzy coal-electricity property allocation contributes to the shifted pricing mechanism. This paper puts forward suggestions on establishing an accounting system of coal-electricity trading cost, optimizing the mixed governing modes and establishing flexible pricing mechanism to mitigate “coal-electricity contradiction”.

Key words: coal-electricity contradiction, coal-electricity trading, reconstruction of entities, property optimization allocation, adjustable pricing

中图分类号:

F270

刘平阔, 桂俊卿, 杨斯媛, 等. 解决“煤电矛盾”问题:煤电企业拆分重组的思辨[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(4): 21-29.

LIU Pingkuo, GUI Junqing, YANG Siyuan, et al.. AN APPROACH TO “COAL-ELECTRICITY CONTRADICTION” ISSUE: REVIEWS OF RECONSTRUCTION OF COAL-ELECTRICITY ENTITIES[J]. Resources & Industries, 2024, 26(4): 21-29.

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