冯娜. 跨流域调水水源地生态补偿研究[D]. 昆明: 云南财经大学, 2016.
贾舒娴, 黄健柏, 钟美瑞, 2017. 生态文明体制构建下的金属矿产开发生态补偿利益均衡研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 25(11): 122-133. 〔JIA S X, HUANG J B, ZHONG M R, 2017.
Interest-balancing analysis on metal mineral resources ecological
compensation under the construction of ecological civilization system[J].
Chinese Journal of Management Science, 25(11): 122-133.〕
卢珂, 周晶, 林小围, 2018. 基于三方演化博弈的网约车出行市场规制策略[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 20(5): 97-104.〔LU K, ZHOU J, LIN X W, 2018.
Regulation strategy of ride-hailing market based on tripartite evolution
game theory[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences
Edition, 20(5): 97-104.〕
马骏, 程常高, 唐彦, 2021. 基于多主体成本分担博弈的流域生态补偿机制设计[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 31(4): 144-154.〔MA J, CHENG C G, TANG Y, 2021.
Design of watershed ecological compensation mechanism based on multi-agent
cost sharing game[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 31(4): 144-154.〕
毛建忠, 孙燕利, 贺克雕, 等, 2017. 牛栏江—滇池补水工程对滇池外海的水环境改善效果研究[J]. 水资源保护, 33(2): 47-51.〔MAO J Z, SUN Y L, HE K D, et al., 2017. Study of water environment improvement effect
by Niulan River-Dianchi Lake water supplement project in Waihai area of Dianchi
Lake[J]. Water Resources Protection, 33(2): 47-51.〕
欧阳志宏, 郭怀成, 王婉晶, 等, 2015. 1982—2012年滇池水质变化及社会经济发展水质的影响[J]. 中国环境监测, 31(2): 68-73.〔OUYANG Z H, GUO H C, WANG W J, et al., 2015. Analysis of water quality change and impacts
from socio-economic development in lake Dianchi from 1982 to 2012[J].
Environmental Monitoring in China, 31(2): 68-73.〕
任以胜, 陆林, 虞虎, 等, 2020. 尺度政治视角下的新安江流域生态补偿政府主体博弈[J]. 地理学报, 75(8): 1667-1679.〔REN Y S, LU L, YU H, et al., 2020.
Game of government subjects of eco-compensation in the Xin’an River
basin based on the politics of scale[J]. Acta Geographica Sinica, 75(8): 1667-1679.〕
孙付华, 张晓杰, 高鑫, 等, 2021. 基于声誉效应的跨流域生态补偿演化合作机制分析[J]. 资源与产业, 23(1): 87-96.〔SUN F H, ZHANG X J, GAO X, et al., 2021. Cooperative mechanism of trans-stream
ecological compensation evolution based on reputation effect[J]. Resources
& Industries, 23(1): 87-96.〕
孙翔, 王玢, 董战峰, 2021. 流域生态补偿理论基础与模式创新[J]. 改革(8): 145-155.〔SUN X, WANG B, DONG Z F, 2021.
Watershed ecological compensation: theoretical basis and model
innovation[J]. Reform(8): 145-155.〕
谭婉冰, 2018. 基于强互惠理论的湘江流域生态补偿演化博弈研究[J]. 湖南社会科学(3): 158-165.
徐松鹤, 韩传峰, 2019. 基于微分博弈的流域生态补偿机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 27(8): 199-207.〔XU S H, HAN C F, 2019. Study
on basin ecological compensation mechanism based on differential game theory[J].
Chinese Journal of Management Science, 27(8): 199-207.〕
许玲燕, 杜建国, 汪文丽, 2017. 农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 27(5): 17-26.〔XU L Y, DU J G, WANG W L, 2017. Evolutionary game analysis on rural water
environmental governance[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment,
27(5): 17-26.〕
许智海, 于成功, 李晓霞, 2019. 基于三方演化博弈的汽车共享出行市场发展策略[J]. 汽车实用技术(9): 213-216.〔XU Z H, YU C G, LI X X, 2019.
Development strategy of car-sharing travel market based on tripartite
evolutionary game[J]. Automobile Applied Technology(9): 213-216.〕
杨志, 牛桂敏, 兰梓睿, 2021. 左右岸跨界水污染治理演化博弈与政策路径研究[J]. 中国环境科学,41(11): 5446-5456.〔YANG Z, NIU G M, LAN Z R, 2021.
Policy strategy of transboundary water pollution control in boundary
rivers based on the evolutionary game[J]. China Environmental Science,41(11):
5446-5456.〕
袁亮, 祁煜智, 何伟军, 等, 2023. 跨国界河流水资源冲突演化博弈模拟研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 20(3): 1-8.〔YUAN L, QI Y Z, HE W J, et al., 2023. Game Simulation of water resource conflict
evolution in transboundary rivers[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science,
20(3): 1-8.〕
张婕, 倪存昊, 朱明明, 2020. 新安江流域生态补偿财政支出效率研究[J]. 中国环境管理, 12(4): 112-119.〔ZHANG J, NI C H, ZHU M M, 2020.
Study on the financial expenditure efficiency of ecological compensation
in Xin’an river basin[J]. Chinese Journal of Environmental Management, 12(4):
112-119.〕
张长征, 湛娉婷, 2021. 澜湄流域国家水资源取用策略选择及因素分析:以“老挝沙湾-泰国莫达汉”两主体博弈行为为例[J]. 资源与产业, 23(2): 82-92.〔ZHANG C Z, ZHAN P T, 2021. A
case study on LAOS SHAWN-THAILAND MODAHAN gaming: water use strategies and
factors of lanmei stream nations[J]. Resources & Industries, 23(2): 82-92.〕
郑冲泉, 白致昆, 2020. 牛栏江-滇池补水工程水源区与输水区水环境保护思考[J]. 水利水电技术, 51(S2): 342-345.〔ZHENG C Q, BAI Z K, 2020.
Consideration on water environments of water source area and water
conveyance area of Niulan River-Dianchi Lake Water Supplement Project[J]. Water
Resources and Hydropower Engineering, 51(S2): 342-345.〕
BIER V M, LIN S W, 2013. Should the model for risk-informed regulation
be game theory rather than decision theory[J]. Risk Analysis, 33(2): 281-291.
CHEN Y, HU Z G, LIU Q, et al., 2020.
Evolutionary game analysis of tripartite cooperation strategy under mixed
development environment of cascade hydropower stations[J]. Water Resources
Management, 34(6): 1951-1970.
FRIEDMAN A, 1991. A simple testable model of double auction
markets[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 15(1): 47-70.
GAO X, SHEN J Q, HE W J, et al., 2019. An evolutionary game analysis of governments’
decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological
compensation in China[J]. Journal of Environmental Management, 251: 109592.
KUCUKMEHMETOGLU M, 2012. An integrative
case study approach between game theory and paretofrontierconcepts for the
transboundary water resources allocations[J]. Journal of Hydrology, 450-451:308-319.
LI L, SONG Y, ZHANG Z Q, 2021. A tripartite game analysis of environmental
pollution control based on complicated intergovernmental relations[J].
Complexity, 2021:8148799.
RITZBERGER K, WEIBULL W, 1996. Evolutionary selection in normal form games[J].
Econometrica, 63(6): 1371-1399.
SKINNER M W, JOSEPH A E, KUHN R G,
2003. Social and environmental
regulation in rural China: bringing the changing role of local government into
focus[J]. Journal of Geoforum, 34(2): 267-281.
ZHU K, ZHANG Y, WANG M, et al., 2022. The ecological compensation mechanism in a
cross regional water diversion project using evolutionary game theory: the case
of the Hanjiang river basin, China[J]. Water, 14(7): 1151.
|