面向工业气体制造企业能源消费低碳转型的演化博弈研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 工业气体作为“工业血液”贯穿于整个工业领域，推动工业气体制造企业能源消费低碳转型是助力工业绿色发展的关键之一。以往的研究更多的是从提高能源利用率入手，少有研究从工业气体制造企业能源消费结构源头上研究解决因设备能源消耗巨大而造成的环境污染问题。鉴于工业气体制造企业在能源消费低碳转型过程中受到转型成本的限制，需要政府介入制定相应政策。通过考虑企业转型的综合条件，构建了政府与企业之间的演化博弈模型，分析了政府与企业决策行为规律，探索了政府补贴下企业低碳转型的演化路径，并运用PYTHON仿真分析技术研究企业综合条件对企业低碳转型的影响作用。研究表明：1) 政府补贴决定了企业是否具备自主转型的能力，而企业的综合条件决定了最终的演化路径。企业的目标规模规划压力、转型成本压力分别与企业综合条件呈正、负相关关系。2) 针对综合条件较差的企业，政府补贴应以降低企业的转型成本压力、引导企业朝着目标规模转型而制定。3) 针对综合条件较好的企业，政府补贴应以降低企业目标规模规划压力、尽可能扩大目标规模而制定。通过上述研究，为完善工业领域绿色能源消费支持政策提供了一定的理论参考与指导作用。

关键词: 工业绿色发展, 工业气体, 低碳转型, 演化博弈

Abstract:

As "industrial blood", industrial gases are used throughout the industrial field, so promoting the low-carbon transformation of energy consumption in industrial gas producers is one of the keys to promote the green development of industry. Previous studies have focused more on improving the energy utilization rate, however, few studies have addressed the environmental pollution caused by equipment energy consumption from the source of energy consumption structure of industrial gas producers. Due to the limitation of transformation costs for industrial gas producers in the process of low-carbon transformation of energy consumption, it is necessary for governments to intervene to formulate appropriate policies. By considering the comprehensive conditions of enterprise transformation, we constructed an evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises, analyzed the behavioral law of government and enterprise decision-making, explored the evolutionary path of low-carbon transformation of enterprises under government subsidies, and used PYTHON simulation and analysis technology to study the influence of comprehensive conditions of enterprises on low-carbon transformation of enterprises. The paper shows that the government subsidy determines whether the enterprise has the ability to transform on its own, while the comprehensive conditions of the enterprise determine the final evolution path. The target scale planning pressure and transformation cost pressure of enterprises are positively and negatively correlated with the comprehensive conditions of enterprises, respectively. For enterprises with poor comprehensive conditions, government subsidies should be formulated to reduce the pressure of transformation costs and guide enterprises to transform towards the target scale. For enterprises with better comprehensive conditions, government subsidies should be designed to reduce the pressure of planning for the target scale and expand the target scale as much as possible. Through the above research, it provides certain theoretical references and guidance for the improvement of green energy consumption support policies in the industrial field.

Key words: industrial green development, industrial gas, low-carbon transformation, evolutionary game

陆青, 方华鑫, 侯建朝. 面向工业气体制造企业能源消费低碳转型的演化博弈研究[J]. 资源与产业.

LU Qing, FANG Huaxin, HOU Jianchao. AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME STUDY for Low-carbon Transformation of Energy Consumption in Industrial Gas Producers[J]. Resources & Industries.

参考文献

柴瑞瑞, 李纲. 可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用:发电企业能源结构转型的演化博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(1): 184-197.〔CHAI R R, LI G. Renewable clean energy and clean utilization of traditional energy: An evolutionary game model of energy structure transformation of power enterprises [J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(1): 184-197.〕

郭沛, 梁栋. 低碳试点政策是否提高了城市碳排放效率——基于低碳试点城市的准自然实验研究[J].自然资源学报,2022,37(07):1876-1892.〔GUO P, LIANG D. Does the low-carbon pilot policy improve the efficiency of urban carbon emissions: Quasi-natural experimental research based on low-carbon pilot cities [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2022,37(07):1876-1892.〕

韩建国. 能源结构调整“软着陆”的路径探析——发展煤炭清洁利用、破解能源困局、践行能源革命[J].管理世界, 2016(2): 3-7.〔HAN J G. Exploring the path of "soft landing" in energy structure adjustment——Developing clean utilization of coal, breaking the energy dilemma, and practicing the energy revolution [J]. Management World, 2016(2): 3-7.〕

何则, 周彦楠, 刘毅. 2050年中国能源消费结构的系统动力学模拟——基于重点行业的转型情景[J].自然资源学报,2020,35(11):2696-2707.〔HE Z, ZHOU Y N, LIU Y. System dynamics simulation on China's energy consumption in 2050: Based on the policy scenarios of key industries[J] [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2020,35(11):2696-2707.〕

侯建, 白婉婷, 陈建成, 等. 能源强度对工业绿色转型的影响：创新效应视角[J].系统管理学报,2022,31(04):737-745.〔HOU J, BAI W T, CHEN J C, et al. Influence of Energy Intensity on Industrial Green Transformation: From An Innovation Effect Perspective [J]. Journal of Systems & Management,2022,31(04):737-745.〕

雷丽彩, 高尚, 陈瑞祥. 大数据“杀熟”如何破？基于政府-消费者协同监管的演化博弈[J].系统管理学报,2021,30(04):664-675.〔Lei L C, Gao S, Chen R X. How To Solve the Problem of Big Data Killing: Evolutionary Game in E-Commerce Market Based on Collaborative Supervision of Government and Consumers [J]. Journal of Systems & Management,2021,30(04):664-675.〕

李靖华, 瞿庆云, 林莉, 等. 内外导向视角下的制造企业服务创新能力演进研究:探索性案例研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理, 2019, 40(5): 87-104.〔LI J H, QU Q Y, LIN L, et al. The evolution of innovation service capability of manufacturers: Internal and external oriented dynamic resource management perspective [J]. Science of Science and Management of S.& T., 2019, 40(5): 87-104.〕

李军强, 任浩. 研发操纵、“多赢困境”与有效监管——随机演化博弈模型与仿真[J].系统管理学报,2020,29(06):1078-1089.〔LI J Q, REN H. Research and Development Manipulation, "Multi-Win Dilemma," and Effective Regulation-Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation [J]. Journal of Systems & Management,2020,29(06):1078-1089.〕

刘华军, 石印, 郭立祥, 等. 新时代的中国能源革命：历程、成就与展望[J].管理世界,2022,38(07):6-24.〔LIU H J, SHI Y, GUO L X, et al. China's Energy Reform in the New Era: Process, Achievements and Prospects [J]. Management World,2022,38(07):6-24.〕

刘平阔, 桂俊卿. 中国区域碳中和的技术溢出与能源回弹：机理、实证及启示[J].自然资源学报,2023,38(12):3003-3023.〔LIU P K, GUI J Q. Technology spillover and energy rebound of carbon neutrality in eight regions of China: Theory, empirical analysis and enlightenment [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2023,38(12):3003-3023.〕

刘素荣, 崔雪, 霍江林. 政府补贴与新能源企业投融资期限错配——基于补贴退坡政策的准自然实验[J].华东经济管理:1-10[2023-10-31].〔LIU S R, CUI X, HUO J L. Government Subsidy and Maturity Mismatch of Investment and Financing of New Energy Listed Companies：A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Subsidy Decline Policy [J]. East China Economic Management:1-10[2023-10-31].〕

吕清刚, 李诗媛, 黄粲然. 工业领域煤炭清洁高效燃烧利用技术现状与发展建议[J].中国科学院院刊, 2019, 34(4): 392-400.〔LV Q G, LI S Y, HUANG C R. Current situation and development suggestions of coal clean and efficient combustion technology in industry field [J]. Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2019, 34(4): 392-400.〕

马少超, 范英. 能源系统低碳转型中的挑战与机遇: 车网融合消纳可再生能源[J].管理世界, 2022, 38(5): 209-220+242+221-223.〔MA S C, FAN Y. Challenges and opportunities in the low-carbon transformation of energy systems: Utilising renewable energy through a vehicle-to-grid model [J]. Management World, 2022, 38(5): 209-220+242+221-223.〕

孟斌, 张欣, 匡海波, 等. 基于政府调控的绿色智慧港口转型演化及扩散研究[J].中国管理科学, 2022,30(8): 21-35.〔MENG B, ZHANG X, KUANG H B, et al. Study on the evolutionary game and diffusion of green smart port construction under government regulation [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(8): 21-35.〕

唐志鹏, 于浩杰, 陈明星, 等. 基于函数极值条件下的中国碳达峰碳中和情景分析[J].自然资源学报,2022,37(05):1247-1260.〔TANG Z P, YU H J, CHEN M X, et al. The scenario analysis of China's carbon emission peak and carbon neutrality based on extremum condition of function [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2022,37(05):1247-1260.〕

田华征, 马丽. 中国工业碳排放强度变化的结构因素解析[J].自然资源学报,2020,35(03):639-653. 〔TIAN H Z, MA L. Study on the change of China's industrial carbon emission intensity from the perspective of sector structure [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2020,35(03):639-653.〕

王长建, 汪菲, 叶玉瑶, 等. 基于供需视角的中国煤炭消费演变特征及其驱动机制[J].自然资源学报,2020,35(11):2708-2723.〔WANG C J, WANG F, YE Y Y, et al. Evolving characteristics and driving mechanism of coal consumption in China Based on the perspective of supply and demand [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2020,35(11):2708-2723.〕

温馨. “双碳”目标下的能源转型:多维阐释与中国策略[J].贵州社会科学, 2021(10): 145-151.〔WEN X. Energy transformation under the "dual carbon" goal: multidimensional interpretation and China's strategy [J]. Guizhou Social Sciences, 2021(10): 145-151.〕

徐乐, 马永刚, 王小飞. 基于演化博弈的绿色技术创新环境政策选择研究:政府行为VS.公众参与[J].中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3):30-42.〔XU L, MA Y G, WANG X F. Study on environmental policy selection for green technology innovation based on evolutionary game: Government behavior vs. public participation [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(3): 30-42.〕

徐婉迪, 魏来, 罗俊, 等. 储能产业发展带来的能源革命及其关键管理科学问题[J].系统管理学报,2021,30(01):191-197.〔Xu W D, Wei L, Luo J, et al. Energy Revolution Empowered by Development of Energy Storage Industry and Its Key Management Science Issues [J]. Journal of Systems & Management,2021,30(01):191-197.〕

薛飞, 周民良, 赵政楠. 工业园区低碳转型的碳减排效应评估——来自国家低碳工业园区试点的经验证据[J].经济体制改革, 2022(6): 98-105.〔XUE F, ZHOU M L, ZHAO Z N. Evaluation of carbon emission reduction effect of low⁃carbon transformation in industrial park——Evidence from China's National Pilot Low⁃Carbon Industrial Park [J]. Reform of Economic System, 2022(6): 98-105.〕

曾珍香, 孙菁烩, 李春雨. 云制造模式下制造企业低碳策略选择与博弈演化研究[J].系统科学学报,2022,30(03):102-107+113.〔Zeng Z X, Sun J Z, Li C Y. Research on Selection of Low⁃carbon Strategy and Game Evolution of Manufacturing Enterprises under Cloud Manufacturing Mode [J]. Chinese Journal of Systems Science,2022,30(03):102-107+113.〕

周永圣, 梁淑慧, 刘淑芹, 等. 绿色信贷视角下建立绿色供应链的博弈研究[J].管理科学学报, 2017, 20(12): 87-98.〔ZHOU Y S, LIANG S H, LIU S Q, et al. The game study of establishing green supply chain from the perspective of green credit [J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2017, 20(12): 87-98.〕

ALTENBURG T, RODRIK D. Green industrial policy: accelerating structural change towards wealthy green economies[C]. ALTENBURG T, ASSMANN C, editors. Green Industrial Policy. Concept, Policies, Country Experiences. Geneva, Bonn: UNEnvironment; German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 2017, 2–20.

FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics [J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666.

Li Y, Ding Y, Cao M. Optimization of energy-saving distillation system of absorption heat pump based on intermediate heat exchange [J]. Applied Thermal Engineering, 2022, 213: 118721.

Mora CA, Orjuela A. Modeling, validation and exergy evaluation of a thermally-integrated industrial cryogenic air separation plant in Colombia [J]. Chemical Engineering Research and Design, 2022,185:73-86.

Singla R, Chowdhury K. Reducing power consumption in a cryogenic air separation plant for filling oxygen cylinders in-situ by utilizing thermal energy of pumped liquid oxygen [J]. Applied Thermal Engineering, 2022, 200: 117623.

Zhang Q, Pinto JM. Energy-aware enterprise-wide optimization and clean energy in the industrial gas industry [J]. Computers & Chemical Engineering, 2022,165:107927.

Zhang X, Zhu Q, Li X, Pan Y. The impact of government subsidy on photovoltaic enterprises independent innovation based on the evolutionary game theory [J]. Energy, 2023,129385.

[1]	陈玥, 庞庆华. 基于前景理论的黄河流域水环境治理三方演化博弈研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(4): 170-178.
[2]	刘林玲, 刘红琴, 谭丽峰. 基于多利益主体的调水工程生态补偿演化博弈分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(1): 154-161.
[3]	肖雨彤, 陈军. 全球碳中和愿景下绿色能源国际合作的演化博弈分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2023, 25(3): 19-30.
[4]	田泽, 肖玲颖, 梁伟, 等. 黄河流域工业绿色低碳转型与经济高质量发展耦合协调研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2023, 25(1): 14-26.
[5]	戴诗茂, 马雪飞, 孙浩. 政府制定生态修复目标与生态修复产业的市场化发展关系研究——基于演化博弈的方法 [J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(6): 127-136.
[6]	沈泓成, 罗婷, 叶骥 . 环境规制强度对浙江省工业绿色发展影响研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(5): 61-69.
[7]	孙付华, 蔡彬彬, 沈菊琴. 水资源和水环境约束下的工业绿色GDP核算及发展效率研究——以长三角为例[J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(3): 32-42.
[8]	杨耀红, 刘盈, 代静, 等. 补赔奖融合机制下流域干支流治污减排策略演化博弈分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(3): 114-125.
[9]	朱智洺, 姚婷, 郭伶俐. 长三角区域双向水足迹生态补偿演化博弈研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2022, 24(2): 54-63.
[10]	付晓灵, 翟子瑜. 水环境治理PPP项目利益主体行为的演化博弈研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2021, 23(3): 70-78.
[11]	张长征, 湛娉婷. 澜湄流域国家水资源取用策略选择及因素分析——以“老挝沙湾-泰国莫达汉”两主体博弈行为为例[J]. 资源与产业, 2021, 23(2): 82-92.
[12]	孙付华, 张晓杰, 高鑫, 等. 基于声誉效应的跨流域生态补偿演化合作机制分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2021, 23(1): 87-96.
[13]	马骏，夏正仪. 长江流域重点生态功能区生态补偿研究——基于演化博弈的博弈策略及因素分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2020, 22(3): 20-30.
[14]	沈菊琴，杨钰妍，高鑫，等，2019. 治理修复视角下的水源地生态补偿利益均衡分析[J]. 资源与产业, 2019, 21(4): 28-35.