企业异质性对低碳技术合作稳定性的影响研究

doi:10.13776/j.cnki.resourcesindustries.20241022.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 低碳技术合作是企业减少低碳生产成本和提升市场竞争力的重要途径，企业异质性在合作中的作用日益凸显。本文基于博弈论分析方法，从企业收益和企业创新成本异质性两个维度出发，研究企业间开展低碳技术创新合作的策略选择及收敛趋势。研究结果表明:双方企业单独投入的成本差异和两企业间的收益差异过大不利于促进企业间的低碳创新合作；企业间需要付出的成本以及规模都相似时，双方企业是否参与低碳技术创新合作是不确定的；加大对不合作者的监管和惩罚力度、降低搭便车收益，或者提高合作时带来的收益，都有助于提高双方企业参与低碳合作的概率。基于此，本文提出要提高企业的创新能力，增加政府对企业合作的监管和正确引导，探索合理的合作机制等建议推动企业开展高效的低碳合作，促进低碳发展。

关键词: 低碳技术创新, 演化博弈, 企业异质性, 合作稳定性

Abstract: Low carbon technical cooperation is a key path to reducing low carbon producing costs and raising market competitiveness, during which enterprise heterogeneity plays an increasing role. This paper uses gaming theory to study low carbon cooperation strategic selection and converging trend among enterprises from their gains and innovative cost heterogeneities. A larger cost/gain difference in either side between partnering enterprises adversely affects their low carbon innovative cooperation. Their cooperation will be uncertain if partnering enterprises need to pay similar costs and scales. Uncooperative partners need to be punished or decreased their gains, or cooperation brings higher gains, both helpful in increasing cooperative probabilities for partnering enterprises in low carbon cooperation. This paper presents suggestions on increasing enterprises’ innovative capabilities, boosting governmental supervision and leading, exploring appropriate cooperative mechanism to reach an effective low carbon cooperation so as to promote a low carbon development.

Key words: low carbon technical innovation, evolutionary gaming, enterprise heterogeneity, cooperative stability

中图分类号:

F205

郭远维, 支援. 企业异质性对低碳技术合作稳定性的影响研究[J]. 资源与产业, 2024, 26(5): 145-153.

GUO Yuanwei, ZHI Yuan. IMPACTS OF ENTERPRISE HETEROGENEITY ON LOW CARBON TECHNICAL COOPERATION STABILITY[J]. Resources & Industries, 2024, 26(5): 145-153.

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